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Abstract 
 
The paper investigates the contribution of cooperative and non-cooperative R&D subsidies to 
firm growth. Of particular interest is hereby firms’ embeddedness into subsidized cooperation 
networks. For the empirical analysis we utilize an unbalanced panel of 2.199 German 
manufacturing firms covering the time period from 1999 to 2009. A dynamic panel estimation 
technique is employed to control for growth autocorrelation as well as endogeneity.  
Our findings show that non-cooperative R&D subsidies have a stimulating impact on large 
firms’ employment growth. In contrast being engaged in many subsidized cooperation is 
related to significant growth-reducing effects. In the case of large firms, exceptions are 
subsidized cooperation with geographically distant firms, which can positively influence 
employment growth. For small firms, rather interactions with research organizations are 
found to facilitate their development. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Firm growth and its determining factors have received considerable attention in the 
literature (see for a review Coad, 2009). Amongst these factors are R&D (research and 
development) subsidies, which are argued to support innovation activities and thereby 
(indirectly) facilitate their economic development (Busom, 2000). Rich empirical evidence 
exists that confirms such positive effects of R&D subsidies (cf. Czarnitzki et al., 2007). 
The adaption of knowledge from firm external sources is another growth stimulating 
factor that is particularly emphasized in endogenous growth theories (Romer, 1990). The 
absorption and utilization of such knowledge is achieved via various mechanisms including 
firms’ engagement in inter-organizational cooperation. The contribution of cooperation to 
firm’ economic performance has also been subject to many theoretical and empirical studies 
(cf. Powell et al., 1996; Powell et al., 1999). In this literature it is widely accepted that firms’ 
generally benefit from cooperating with other organizations. 
While significant empirical evidence exist for cooperation and R&D subsidies 
facilitating firms’ development (cf. Brouwer et al., 1993; Czarnitzki et al., 2007), it is rarely 
considered that firms frequently (and to an increasing extent) engage into inter-organizational 
cooperation in order for being rewarded with R&D subsidies. By participating in such 
programs firms become embedded into (subsidized) cooperation networks (Broekel and Graf, 
2011), which can have significant effects on firms’ innovation and patenting activities as 
Fornahl et al. (2011) recently highlighted in their study on the German biotech industry. 
The present paper contributes to these literature streams with an empirical study on the 
relevance of non-cooperative and cooperative R&D subsidies for firms’ employment growth. 
We are evaluating their relative importance and, in case of cooperative subsidies, also 
explicitly take into account their function of embedding firms into (subsidized) cooperation 
networks. More precise, we particularly investigate the impact of a firms’ position in these 
networks and whether it matters with what types of organizations they cooperate with. 
Our study is based on a panel of 2,199 German manufacturing firms covering the time 
period from 2004 to 2009. A Systems-GMM approach is applied to deal with endogeneity and 
growth autocorrelation.  
The empirical analysis provides empirical evidence for non-cooperative R&D 
subsidies positively influencing the employment growth of large firms. This contrasts the 
results for cooperative R&D subsidies for which no direct effects are identified. It matters 
however that firms engage in subsidized cooperation. For instance, we find a growth-
stimulating effect of cooperating with public research organizations. In case of large firms 
rather interacting with geographically distant firms seem to be of larger importance. We also 
observe negative effects being associated to cooperating, which are primarily related to 
extensive participation in subsidized cooperation. 
  The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the 
empirical evaluation of subsidies and cooperation as well as their relevance for firm growth. 
Hypotheses are subsequently developed in the same section. Section 3 focuses on the 
methodology, the employed data, and the construction of the empirical variables. The findings 
are presented and discussed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
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2 Theoretical background and hypotheses 
 
A substantial literature studies the determinants of firm growth. McKelvie and 
Wiklund (2010) summarize the main research streams within this literature. The first of these 
streams focuses on growth as the outcome of economic processes and firm characteristics. 
The second stream concentrates on the results and effects of firm growth and the third stream 
studies the growth process itself. The present paper fits into the first stream by focusing on the 
role subsidies play for the economic success of firms. 
Subsidies and the evaluation of their impact on the economic success of firms have 
received substantial empirical attention in the literature. It has, for example, been shown that 
subsidies impact firms’ R&D efforts (cf. Busom, 2000; Gorg and Strobl, 2007) and 
employment growth (cf. Brouwer et al., 1993; Girma et al., 2008). In other words, subsidies 
are shown to be very relevant for firms’ economic development.  
In the following, we focus on one particular type of subsidies, namely R&D subsidies. 
There are multiple reasons for R&D subsidies being granted. For instance, they are used to 
stimulate private research in fields that are politically desirable. In Germany this applies to 
new technologies and so-called key technologies that are foremost supported (Fier, 2002). 
Subsidies for R&D are also argued to be necessary because private investments into R&D 
activities are perceived to be below a social optimum. The uncertainty and risks involved in 
innovation activities are particularly important amongst the reasons for insufficient 
investments (Cantwell, 1999). Financial constraints further reduce the amounts invested in 
R&D and strongly hamper innovation. R&D subsidies can remove these obstacles by 
providing additional financial resources for innovation-oriented activities. As for subsidies in 
general, the financial aspects of R&D subsidies have therefore received most attention in their 
scientific evaluation (cf. Czarnitzki and Hussinger, 2004; Czarnitzki et al., 2007). 
The empirical relation between R&D subsidies and employment growth is likely to be 
different from that between employment growth and other types of subsidies. First of all, 
R&D subsidies are predominantly aimed at expanding firms’ R&D capacities and impact their 
ability to grow in the middle and long run. Their effects on employment are thereby indirect 
in nature contrasting the rather direct effects of many other subsidies types. 
Secondly, R&D subsidies generally tend to be relative small in terms of granted 
monetary amounts. For the empirical investigation it implies that the empirical detection of an 
impact on employment growth is less likely. 
 Thirdly, firms participating in R&D subsidy programs are probably structurally 
different from those that apply for non-R&D related subsidies. Foremost, the latter firms do 
not necessarily conduct R&D, which is however a requirement for firms’ to obtain R&D 
subsidies. This may impact the empirical findings insofar as firms active in R&D show 
different (more positive) growth patterns than those that do not invest in R&D (Brower et al., 
1993). 
Despite these unique characteristics of R&D subsidies they are expected to stimulate 
firms’ employment growth, which is supported by already existing empirical evidence 
(Czarnitzki et al., 2007). Our first hypothesis emphasizes these potentially positive effects of 
R&D subsidies. 
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H1: R&D subsidies facilitate firms’ employment growth. 
 
Another growth-stimulating factor that has received considerable attention in the 
recent literature is a firm’s capability to invent and use new knowledge (Zahra et. al., 2006). 
Cohen and Levinthal (1990) famously pointed out that a firms’ competence in absorbing 
external information and knowledge is crucial in this respect (absorptive capacity). O’Regon 
et.al (2006) argue similarly that firms are unlikely to sustain their competitive advantage 
without access to greater (and potentially external) research and development resources. It is 
therefore particularly important for firms to interact with external knowledge sources to 
continuously innovate and generate growth momentum (cf. Powell et al., 1996). 
One way for firms to access external knowledge is to engage in formal and informal 
cooperation with other organizations.1
However, cooperation might not always be beneficial. The establishment and 
maintenance of cooperation agreements require efforts. Cooperation might fail, which implies 
a wasting of these efforts (Bleeke and Ernst, 1993). Another reason for potential negative 
effects of cooperation is free-riding on partners’ R&D efforts (Kesteloot and Veugelers, 
1995). “[L]earning races between the partners [...], diverging opinions on intended benefits 
[...] and a lack of flexibility and adaptability” (Faems et al., 2005, p. 240) can additionally 
induce negative effects. Another danger inherent to cooperative activities is the potential 
“leakage” of crucial knowledge to competitors (De Bondt et al., 1992).
 Such inter-organizational cooperation in R&D is an 
important supplement to internal R&D activities as it generally increases the probability of 
innovative success (Oerleman and Meeus, 2000). Cooperating organizations benefit from the 
sharing of risks and costs (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002), access to complementary 
knowledge and assets (Teece, 1986), and their transfer into the organization (Eisenhardt and 
Schoonhoven, 1996). Accordingly, it can be argued (and it is empirically shown) that firms, 
which are well embedded into a wide range of cooperation are likely to be in superior 
positions for achieving above average innovation performance and eventually employment 
growth (cf. Powell et al., 1996). 
2
 Nevertheless, cooperation is generally perceived to enhance firms’ economic 
performance (cf. Li and Vanhaverbeke, 2009). This has also been noticed by policy. An 
increasing number of programs aiming at the stimulation of growth are characterized by 
strong cooperative elements. In addition to the previous arguments, policy intervention is 
motivated by the fact that some projects are too big to be realized by a single organization, 
which makes cooperation a necessity. Policy also frequently tries to stimulate technology 
transfer from public to private organizations. Universities and research organizations are 
encouraged to participate in the respective funding programs and to engage in cooperation 
with private firms. Prominent examples for such policies are the framework programs by the 
EU, which provide strong incentives for firms and research organizations to engage in joint 
projects (cf. Scherngell and Barber, 2011). 
 
 In a similar fashion, the German federal government is increasingly supporting 
cooperative (i.e. joint) projects with R&D subsidies. Broekel and Graf (2011) estimate that 
                                                          
1 Other mechanisms are for instance labor mobility and the exchange of embodied knowledge via the trading of 
good and tools. 
2 See also Broekel et al. (2011) for a discussion of these issues. 
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about 30% of all R&D subsidy grants by the German federal government are given to 
consortia of organizations realizing joint research projects. These authors as well as Fornahl et 
al. (2011) argue that such cooperative subsidies might take effect on firms’ performance 
beyond the “simple” monetary effects because they also imply active engagements in 
cooperative activities. In contrast to unsubsidized cooperation, which are frequently 
approximated by patents (Ejermo and Karlsson, 2006), venture capital syndication (Sorenson 
and Stuart, 2001), director inter-locks (Mizruchi, 1996), joint publication (Ponds et al., 2010), 
or interview data on inter-organizational interaction (Uzzi, 1996), little is known about the 
relationship between such subsidized cooperation and firm performance. While most of the 
literature agrees that (unsubsidized) cooperation generally enhances innovative and economic 
performance it is still unclear whether the same can be said about subsidized cooperation. 
Differences in the structure and effects of subsidized and unsubsidized cooperation 
can be expected to exist, though, because policy heavily interferes in the establishment and 
process of (subsidized) cooperation. For instance, it defines the general conditions of 
cooperating in subsidies programs and selects those proposals that are granted, which might 
not be the ones that are economically most beneficial. Moreover, the pool of potential 
cooperation partners is likely to differ between unsubsidized and subsidized cooperation as in 
the latter case it will include only those organizations that (for whatever reasons) seek and 
apply for R&D subsidies. 
 Despite these differences to unsubsidized cooperation, subsidized cooperation is also 
shown to impact firms’ economic success. Fornahl et al. (2011) provide empirical evidence 
for the existence of differences in the effects of cooperative and non-cooperative subsidies for 
the German biotech industry. These authors show that a firm’s innovation performance is not 
enhanced by non-cooperative subsidies but by firms being engaged in subsidized cooperation. 
This motivates our second hypothesis. 
 
H2: Cooperative R&D subsidies are more conducive for employment growth than 
non-cooperative R&D subsidies. 
 
Broekel and Graf (2011) as well as Fornahl et al. (2011) argue further that by 
participating in joint projects, organizations become embedded into inter-organizational 
cooperation networks. These cooperation networks are likely to represent effective channels 
of knowledge diffusion, i.e. knowledge networks, because participating organizations agree to 
substantial knowledge sharing regulations. Accordingly, knowledge network effects might 
also be present when firms engage in subsidized joint projects. Such effects imply that 
knowledge can diffuse beyond directly linked organizations. It means further that a partner’s 
partners become relevant for a cooperating firm. Fornahl et al. (2011) find that firms’ with 
many direct links do not experience above average innovation performance. Rather those 
firms benefit from being embedded in subsidized cooperation networks that have easy access 
to knowledge located at very different areas in the networks. On this basis we formulate the 
third hypothesis as follows.  
 
H3: Firms profit from holding central network positions with easy access to 
knowledge located elsewhere in the network. 
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Partnering organizations need to “fit” to each other in order to profit from cooperating. 
This involves a common understanding of the joint project‘s aims and the willingness to share 
knowledge, resources, as well as capabilities (cf. Cantner and Meder, 2007). Moreover, 
different forms of proximity between the partners (geographic, institutional, social, 
organizational, and cognitive) impact the effectiveness of interacting (Boschma, 2005). As in 
the case of unsubsidized cooperation, it matters with whom organizations cooperate. The 
empirical literature suggests that linkages to research organizations and universities might be 
especially knowledge rich and valuable (cf. Beise and Stahl, 1999; Raspe and van Oort, 
2011). The fourth hypothesis takes these findings up. 
 
H4: Subsidized linkages to research organizations and universities enable firms to 
outgrow firms that primarily cooperate with other firms. 
 
Another aspect that has frequently been investigated is the relevance of the 
geographical dimension of firms’ cooperative links. Geographic proximity to partners is 
frequently argued to enhance the effectiveness of inter-organizational knowledge exchange 
(see for a discussion Boschma, 2005). Accordingly, organizations that frequently cooperate 
with organizations located within small geographic distance are more likely to benefit from 
cooperating (Oerlemans and Meeus, 2005). Our fifth hypothesis highlights such effects of 
geographic proximity. 
 
H5: Geographic proximity to cooperation partners enhances the effectiveness of 
knowledge transfer and thereby is conducive for firm growth. 
 
 So far, we treated all firms as being homogenous. However, there are good reasons to 
believe that some of the previously outlined relationships vary in their importance for 
different types of firms.  For instance, research on SMEs reveals that these firms especially 
obtain a great share of knowledge from external advisors, universities, and other firms (cf. 
Beise and Stahl, 1999; O’Regan et.al. 2005; Raspe and van Oort 2008). Accordingly, we 
expect cooperation and in particular cooperation with research organizations (including 
universities) to be more important for small than for larger firms. This leads to the sixth 
hypothesis, which highlights these differences related to firm size. 
 
H6: Differences exist in the importance of subsidized cooperation between small and 
large firms. Links to research institutes and universities are particularly more 
conducive to small firms’ growth. 
 
In the following, we present the employed database before the approach is discussed 
with which the six hypotheses are empirically tested. 
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3 Data source and empirical variables  
 
3.1  Data sources 
 
We use the MARKUS database provided by the Bureau van Dijk as data source. It 
contains 1.3 million German, Austrian, and Luxembourgian firms. For this paper we focus 
only on German manufacturing companies with information on their names, industry 
affiliation, zip code, sales/turnover, and their total employment numbers. Sales/turnover and 
employment data are available for the time period from 2001 to 2010, however with many 
missing values. In an initial step, a firm population is selected consisting of 14,018 firms for 
which sales/turnover and employment information is available at least for the time period 
2004 to 2009.  
This information is matched to data on R&D projects that were subsidized by the 
following German federal ministries: Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF), Ministry 
of Economics and Technology (BMWi), and the Federal Ministry for Environment, Nature 
Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU). Accordingly, the data covers the most important 
sources of R&D subsidies on the federal level. It is recorded in the so-called “Förderkatalog” 
(subsidies catalogue), which is accessible via the website www.foerderkatalog.de. The 
database offers very detailed information on more than 110,000 projects that were supported 
between 1960 and 2009 including information on the name and location of the receiving 
organization. It is important to point out that the data does not provide complete information 
on all types of R&D subsidies a firm can potentially receive. Only R&D related subsidies 
granted by the German federal government are covered leaving aside all non-R&D related 
subsidies and all subsidies from other political levels (e.g. the German federal states 
(“Länder”), districts, and EU). 
The R&D subsidies data allows for differentiating between subsidies granted to joined 
projects (i.e. cooperative subsidies) and those that are granted to single organizations (i.e. 
non-cooperative projects). Organizations that participate in such joint projects agree to a 
number of regulations that guarantee significant knowledge exchange between the partners. 
Accordingly, two organizations are defined to cooperate if they participate in the same joint 
project (see for more details Broekel and Graf, 2011).  
Of the 14,018 firms in the sample from the MARKUS database 733 firms are 
identified to have received subsidies in at least one year between 2001 and 2008.3
                                                          
3  In the empirical estimation we consider a time lag between employment growth and subsidies. The smallest 
considered lag is one year. 
 With just 
733 of 13,285 being subsidized any subsidies based variable will be heavily inflated with zero 
values, which might be problematic in the empirical assessment. We therefore create a smaller 
control group of unsubsidized firms. More precisely, we first consider all firms that did not 
receive subsidies between 2001 and 2008, for which we have complete information 
concerning their industry classification, employment (2004-2009), and turnover (2004-2009). 
Second, for each of the 733 subsidized firms we chose two unsubsidized firms from this 
sample that belong to the same 6-digit NACE industry and that are most similar in terms of 
their employment number. Each of these “control” firms is considered only once. In the rare 
instance that a 6-digit NACE industry is too small to offer a sufficiently large number of 
8 
 
control firms, we consider firms of the same 5-digit and 4-digit industry, respectively. 
Accordingly, subsidized firms represent one third of the final sample, which amounts to 2.199 
firms. 
 
3.2  Descriptive statistics and correlations 
 
 The final unbalanced panel consists of 2.199 firms and 24.189 observations. Figure 1 
shows the firm size distribution in 2008. Given the way the sample is constructed it closely 
resamples the size distribution of the 733 firms that received subsidies. 
The figure shows that firms with less than 200 employees dominate our data base. However, 
compared to the overall distribution of firm sizes in Germany, the larger firms with more than 
200 employees, which account for less than 1% of all German firms, are overrepresented in 
our sample. This reflects the overall bias of the MARKUS database towards larger firms and 
is further increased by the better data availability for larger firms and by larger firms being 
more likely to receive subsidies. 
In addition to the two main characteristics of firms (employment, turnover), we 
construct a number of variables on the basis of the subsidies data. They are presented in the 
following. 
The first variable of interest is the total amount of yearly R&D subsidies a firm 
receives from the German federal government (SUBS). For the estimation of the yearly 
monetary amounts we take into account each project’s exact starting and ending data and 
distributed the total sum uniformly in time. Figure 2 pictures the distribution of granted 
subsidies across firm size classes. This means, for instance, that firms with less than 200 
 
Figure 1: Distribution of employment 
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employees receive about 26 percent of the total amount of granted subsidies. Firms with more 
than 1,800 employees obtain the largest share of subsidies with more than 50 percent. 
To get more insights into the impact of subsidies, we split the variable SUBS into the 
number of granted projects (PROJ) and the average amount of subsidies per project (SUBSP). 
This allows for assessing whether the effects of subsidies are related to the size of projects 
(SUPS) or to the total number of projects a firm is involved (PROJ). 
The amount of subsidies is alternatively divided into the amounts coming from a 
firm’s participation in joint projects, i.e. cooperative R&D subsidies (CSUM), and the non-
cooperative R&D subsidies (SUM) that are acquired as subsidies granted to the individual 
firm. In a similar manner as for SUBS both numbers are also split into the average amount of 
subsidies per joint project (CSUMP), the number of joint projects (CPROJ), the amount of 
subsidies per non-cooperative project (SUMP), and the number of non-cooperative subsidized 
projects (SPROJ). 
Using the information on firms’ participation in joint projects we can draw the 
complete inter-organizational networks of subsidized cooperation in Germany. For these 
networks we consider ALL organizations (firms, universities, associations) that receive 
subsidies from the respective German federal ministries in a particular year. Moreover, all 
subsidized research organizations; universities, associations, and other sorts of organizations 
are included in the network (see for more details Broekel and Graf, 2011). Some network 
descriptive can be found in Table 1. Interestingly, the number of organizations in the network 
(including isolates) increases until 2002 before it declines in the subsequent years. We can 
only speculate about this finding, which might be a result of changes in the support policies or 
Figure 2: Distribution of subsidies across firm size classes  
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the burst of the “.com bubble” in 2001. By and large, the density of the network remains 
stable since the number of links (“edges”) drops simultaneously, though. 
 
 
Table 1: Network characteristics 
 
In a common fashion, we approximate potential effects caused by firms’ 
embeddedness into these networks through a firm’s degree (DEGREE) and betweenness 
centrality (BETWEEN) (cf. Boschma and ter Wal, 2007). Degree centralization is 
straightforwardly defined as the number of links an organization has to other organizations. 
Or in the context of this paper, the number of unique partners a firm is cooperating with in 
joint projects in a particular year. 
Betweenness centrality is a more complex measure. It measures if a firm holds a 
‘brokerage’ position in a network implying that it captures the extent to which shortest paths 
linking other organizations ‘run’ through this firm (Wasserman and Faust, 1994). Firm i’s 
betweenness centrality is estimated by: 
  (2) 
with gik being the geodesic distance (DISTANCE) between organization j and k that are part 
of the network. 
 The following variables provide information on the composition of firms’ ego-
networks (their direct partners) with respect to the organizational and institutional background 
of their partners. We consider the share of universities in a firm’s partnering organizations 
(UNI), the share of research organizations (RESEARCH)4
 As pointed out above, we are also interested in the geographical reach of a firm’s ego 
network. For this reason we estimate the average geographic distance to all its partnering 
organizations, which can be seen as a measure of a firms’ embeddedness into local knowledge 
networks (Broekel and Boschma, 2011). 
, and the share of firms (FIRMS). 
The remaining share of miscellaneous organizations (associations, local authorities, and other 
governmental entities) is not considered to avoid perfect collinearity. 
The descriptive statistics of all variables are presented in Table 2. Table A1 (in the 
appendix) presents the correlation structure of the variables. Some interesting observations 
can be made in the correlation table. Most subsidies variables are notably highly correlated. 
For instance, the numbers of projects (PROJ, CPROJ, SPROJ) are always (and not 
surprisingly) correlated to the absolute monetary amounts (SUBS, SUM, CSUM). More 
interestingly, the numbers of cooperative projects (CPROJ) and non-cooperative projects 
(SPROJ) are also highly correlated with r=0.778***. Accordingly, firms that receive subsidies 
apply for cooperative as well as non-cooperative subsidies. However, this correlation is likely 
being impacted by the size of organizations, which is not taken into account in this simple 
                                                          
4 This particularly regards institutes belonging to the “big four” research organizations in Germany: the Max-
Planck Society, the Fraunhofer Society, the Helmholtz Association, and the Leibniz Association. 
Year
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Density 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Nodes 4.069 4.333 4.807 5.263 4.972 4.541 4.414 4.414 3.949 3.331
Edges 11.309 12.161 14.539 15.159 14.118 12.274 12.047 12.571 10.170 7.543
Network 
characteristic
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bivariate analysis. Another observation regards the two network centrality measures 
(DEGREE and BETWEEN), which are highly correlated with each other and with the number 
of cooperative projects (CPROJ). This has to be considered in the later empirical analysis. 
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of variables 
 
4 Empirical approach 
 
For the investigation of the relationship between subsidies and employment growth we 
follow the approach (and notation) by Girma et al. (2008). These authors specify a dynamic 
labour demand function that has been put forward by Nickell (1987): 
    
 
 
whereby EMPLi,t represents the employment, TURNi,t the output (in terms of turnover), 
WAGEi,t the average wage, and SUBSi,t the amount of received subsidies of firm i in t. In 
contrast to Girma et al. (2008), we unfortunately don’t have information on the wage per head 
and moreover find turnover to be highly correlated with employment (r=0.91***).5
                                                          
5 “***“ indicates a significance level of 0.01, “**” significance at 0.05, and “*” significance at 0.01. 
 For this 
reason we rather use the turnover per employee, i.e. labour productivity (PROD), which on 
the one hand allows distinguishing between highly productive and less productive firms and 
on the other should be highly correlated to the wage per head. As Girma et al. (2008) we take 
the logarithm of employment and labour productivity, which yields more robust results. The 
subsidies variables are not logged as they involve many zero values that prevent a proper 
application of the log-transformation. 
Variable Description Mean S.D. Min Max
EMP Number of employees 920.83 11.618.38 1 439.000
PROD Labour productivity (turnover in thousand EURO per employee) 305.91 3.874.21 5.92 249.000
SUBS Amount of received subsidies 36.140.22 428.000.00 0 25.300.000
SUBSP Amount of subsidies per project 12.855.80 47.101.84 0 1.060.000
PROJ Number of granted projects 0.32 2.13 0 96
SUM Subsidies granted to individual firm (non-cooperative R&D subs) 14.422.07 191.000.00 0 10.500.000
CSUM Firm’s participation in joint projects (cooperative R&D subsidies) 21.718.16 260.000.00 0 15.500.000
SUMP Amount of subsidies per non-cooperative project 6.651.35 40.930.78 0 1.060.000
CSUMP Average amount of subsidies per joint project 8.633.66 35.829.08 0 779.000
SPROJ Number of non-cooperative subsidized projects 0.10 0.63 0 24
CPROJ Number of joint granted projects 0.22 1.60 0 74
DEGREE Number of links an organization has to other organizations 1.31 10.64 0 551
BETW Measures if a firm holds a central position in this network 192.25 3.989.49 0 227.000
UNI Share of universities in a firm’s partnering organizations 0.02 0.10 0 1
RESEARCH Share of research organizations 0.02 0.08 0 1
FIRM Share of firms 0.08 0.23 0 1
DIST Geodesic distance between organization and network 35.62 106.61 0 844
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Another difference between Girma et al. (2008) and our study is the more 
differentiated view on subsidies, which are considered as variable g in the above equation. We 
specify a multitude of variables approximating the extent to which firms receive non-
cooperative and cooperative subsidies as well as a wide range of variables capturing their 
embeddedness into the subsidized cooperation networks. The adapted dynamic labour 
demand function looks the following: 
 
 
 
In contrast to the above, PROD represents the labour productivity measure and SUBS 
the matrix of variables based on the subsidies data. 
τt represents time specific effects, ηi time invariant firm level (“fixed”) effects, and εi,t 
finally stands for the error term summarizing all other (stochastic) effects in both models. As 
common in this type of research, we consider a lagged version of the dependent variable in 
the estimation because of the dynamic nature of labour demand that is caused by a “non-
smooth adjustment process” in firms’ employment policy (Girma et al., 2008, p. 1187). The 
consideration of the lagged version of the dependent variable as independent variables 
requires the use of dynamic panel analysis (Arrelano and Bond, 1991). 
In addition, when investigating the impact of subsidies on employment growth the 
most challenging issue is how to deal with potential endogeneity between the empirical 
variables. Endogeneity may be introduced to the econometric model primarily for two 
reasons. First, there might be certain unobserved firm characteristics impacting the probability 
with which firms receive subsidies and which simultaneously influence their employment 
growth. Such factors might be either unobservable or at least empirically hard to approximate. 
Second, while subsidies may influence employment growth the opposite can be the case as 
well. For instance, there might be policy programs specifically aiming at supporting declining 
or fast growing firms. For firms in declining markets it might also be a highly beneficial 
strategy to lobby and apply for subsidies. Accordingly, the relationship between subsidies and 
employment growth is not necessarily mono-directional violating a fundamental assumption 
of standard empirical models. 
In a similar fashion as Girma et al. (2008), we overcome these issues by using the 
Systems-GMM estimator developed by Blundell and Bond (1998). This estimator is widely 
used in current literature and therefore we refrain from introducing it at great length.6
The idea behind the Systems-GMM estimator is that potentially endogenous variables 
are instrumented with their own lags. More precisely, the lags of their first difference as well 
as the lags of their values are used for the instrumentation. A crucial issue is hereby the 
validity of the lagged variables as instruments, which is related to the question of whether 
they can be considered to be exogenous and whether they conflict with over-identification 
restrictions. In a usual manner these issues are checked with a Sargan / Hansen statistic. In 
addition, the errors are required to be free of second-order autocorrelation, which is assessed 
 For 
instance, Lachenmaier and Rottmann (2011) make use of it to investigate the effects of 
innovation on employment. 
                                                          
6 Roodman (2009) provides an excellent introduction to this topic.  
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with the Arrelano - Bond test (Arrelano and Bond, 1991). The final model that is employed 
for the empirical analysis is a two-step Systems-GMM in the spirit of Arrelano and Bover 
(1995) with Windmeijer-corrected cluster robust-errors (Windmeijer, 2005).7
As pointed out above, R&D subsidies are unlikely to result in immediate employment 
expansion. However, it also seems to be impossible to define a reliable time lag between 
granting and the effect on employment, which is particularly the case for network effects. We 
therefore follow Girma et al. (2008) and simultaneously include a range of lags (1, 2, and 3 
years) in the empirical analysis.  
 
 
5 Empirical results 
 
5.1  R&D subsidies and employment growth 
  
 The regression results for various models are reported in Tables A.2, A2a and A2b (in 
the appendix). We specify the lagged employment (EMPLt-1), labour productivity (PRODt), 
and the subsidies variables to be potentially endogenous. Only the included year dummies 
(2004 to 2008 with 2009 being the reference) are considered to be purely exogenous. In all 
models the lagged dependent variable (EMPLt-1) is instrumented with the sixths lag of its 
level and first difference. The level and first difference of the third and fifth lag proved to 
provide robust results for labour productivity (PRODt). With the exception of Model 1 all 
subsidies based variables are instrumented with the sixth lag of their levels and first 
differences. In the first model, also the fifths lag of SUBS’s level and difference are 
considered. The requirements of no overidentification restrictions (as tested with the Sargan 
and Hansen statistics) and exogeneity of the instruments (evaluated with a difference-in-
Hansen test) are fulfilled in all models. In all but two models, further requirements of 
significant first-order autocorrelation and insignificant second order-autocorrelation (as 
indicated by the Arellano-Bond test) are met by considering the first lag of the dependent 
variable (EMPLt-1). In one models (model 8) the second lag of the dependent variable needs to 
be included as well. This will later be discussed in more detail. 
 The lagged employment level turns out to be significantly positive and close to one in 
all models, which is in line with comparable findings in the literature (e.g., Bottazzi and 
Secchi, 2003; Coad, 2009; Girma et al., 2008). Labour productivity is found to be positively 
associated to employment growth (PROD). It means that highly productive firms outgrow less 
productive firms. The variable PROD loses its significance when including variables that 
account for the type of organizations firms’ cooperate with (see Models 7 and 8). This 
observation suggests that a significant portion of this effect is related to highly productive 
firms cooperating with different types of organizations than less productive firms. 
 The year dummies remain insignificant with few exceptions (y2004, y2005, and y2007 
in Models 7 and 8. In all cases they obtain negative coefficients suggesting that firms’ 
employment was lower in most years before 2009 (reference year). In other words, firms’ 
generally increased their size in the considered time period. 
 In the first model we test hypothesis 1 “R&D subsidies stimulate the employment 
growth of firms”. The significant negative coefficient of (the second lag of) SUBS clearly 
                                                          
7 See Roodman (2009) for a detailed discussion of these specifications. 
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rejects this hypothesis and rather indicates that R&D subsidies show a negative relation with 
employment growth. Moreover, this finding contrasts previous results in the literature 
showing that non-R&D related subsidies induce higher employment growth (Girma et al. 
2008). Accordingly, there are significant differences in the effects of the two types of 
subsidies. 
 The second model gives a clearer picture on the source of the negative effects. While 
the variables SUBSP (amount of subsidies per supported project) remains insignificant PROJ 
(number of projects) gains negative significance in the third lag. It implies that firms 
experience lower employment growth when they engage in a large number of subsidized 
projects. In contrast, the size of the individual project (as approximated by the amount of 
received subsidies per project) is not relevant for growth. 
 A major contribution of the present paper to the literature is the differentiated view on 
cooperative and non-cooperative subsidies. According to hypothesis 2 the first ones are more 
likely to generate positive employment effects. The splitting of SUBS into SUMP (amount of 
non-cooperative subsidies) and CSUM (amount of cooperative subsidies) does not yield any 
significant coefficients (Model 3), though. We further differentiate between the numbers of 
subsidized projects (cooperative and non-cooperative) and the respective amounts of subsidies 
per project in Model 4. In this case the number of subsidized cooperative projects (CPROJ) 
gains significance in the first lag with a negative coefficient. In contrast, the other variables - 
number of non-cooperative subsidies (SPROJ), amount of cooperative subsidies per project 
(CSUMP), and amount of non-cooperative subsidies per project (SUMP) – remain 
insignificant. The high correlation between CPROJ and the total number of subsidized 
projects (PROJ) of r=0.982*** implies that the previously observed negative coefficient of 
PROJ has its cause in the negative impact of CPROJ. Accordingly, it is not the extensive 
engagement in subsidized projects in general that yields negative effects but rather the 
engagement in many subsidized cooperative projects. In light of this we have to reject 
hypothesis 2, which suggested a positive relationship between cooperative subsidies and 
employment growth. Before the implications are discussed in more detail it is worthwhile to 
take Models 5 and 6 into consideration as well. They deal with hypothesis 3 according to 
which firms that are central in the cooperation network should experience additional 
employment growth. When considering the two network measures, degree and betweenness 
centrality (DEGREE and BETWEEN) CPROJ loses its significance with these two variables 
also being insignificant. Each of the three variables is however negative significant when 
being separately considered, which suggests that they all explain the same effect. This is also 
visible in the high correlation (r>0.9***) among the three variables, see Table A.1 in the 
Appendix. It means that firms engaging in many cooperative projects are also very central in 
the cooperation network. We estimated a number of alternative models but failed to 
disentangle the effects of these three variables. Nevertheless, the negative relation between 
the number of cooperative projects (or degree and betweenness centrality) implies that we 
have to reject hypothesis 3 as well, as we don’t find positive effects caused by a strong 
embeddedness of firms in the subsidized cooperation network.  
 The rejection of the two hypotheses 2 and 3 is surprising as the theoretical arguments 
as well as empirical evidence strongly support these hypotheses (cf. Becker and Dietz, 2004). 
Moreover, negative effects related to too extensive cooperation activities are rarely reported in 
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empirical studies. Most prominently, Uzzi (1996) highlights negative performance effects 
related to “overembeddedness” into networks. His argument and empirical evidence alludes to 
a strong reliance on few but very intensive relations, though. Brouwer et al. (1993) do not find 
a relationship between firms’ R&D cooperation and employment growth. In the context of 
subsidized cooperation Fornahl et al. (2011) show that intensive engagement in cooperative 
subsidies does not increase firms’ patenting performance. 
As pointed out before, negative effects related to cooperation can have different causes 
including free-riding on partners’ R&D efforts (Kesteloot and Veugelers, 1995) and 
knowledge “leakages” (De Bondt et al., 1992). It is also important that cooperating partners 
fit to each other implying complementary resources and capabilities as well as a shared 
understanding of the project’s aims (Faems et al., 2005). The choice of the right cooperation 
partner is central in this respect (Fornahl et al., 2011). We pointed out before that non-
subsidized cooperation might be quite different from subsidized cooperation as firms’ are less 
free in choosing the most appropriate partner in the latter case. One might therefore speculate 
that it is a problematic selection / combination of firms’ cooperation partners that explains the 
observed negative effects.  
We further explore this issue in model 7 that includes variables approximating the 
share of universities (UNI), the share of research organizations (RESEARCH), and the share 
of firms (FIRMS) in firms’ ego-networks, i.e. their direct links in subsidized cooperation 
projects. The first thing to notice is the positive significance of CPROJ in the second lag 
while the variable is still negative in the first lag. This is however a statistical artifact that 
relates to some incorrectly modeled autocorrelation dynamics in the original model. When 
including the second lag of the dependent variable (LOGEMPt-2) the significance of CPROJ’s 
second lag disappears. This will be discussed in more detail in the next subsection. 
 In addition to CPROJ, also the share of research organizations (RESEARCH) becomes 
significant. The variable’s coefficient is positive and indicates that firms’ benefit from 
intensive cooperation with (public) research organizations. Most notably, this includes 
institutes of the Max-Planck and Fraunhofer Society that represent the majority of links in this 
category. The finding extents previous studies in the literature that find firms to benefit from 
unsubsidized cooperation with research organizations (cf. Beise and Stahl, 1999; Ponds et al. 
2010; Veugelers and Cassiman 2005) to the case of subsidized relations. The positive effect 
of RESEARCH partly confirms our hypothesis 4 according to which relations to universities 
and research organizations are most beneficial. The confirmation is only partly as we do not 
find any statistical evidence for a growth promoting role of links to universities, for which 
rich empirical evidence exists (Jaffe, 1989; Cassia et al., 2009). 
We have to reject hypothesis 5 as we do not observe a significant coefficient for DIST 
approximating the average distance of firms’ direct links. It means that geographic proximity 
does not influence the effectiveness of subsidized R&D cooperation for employment growth. 
Although we now control for the institutional and geographic composition of firms’ ego-
networks CPROJ remains significant. Accordingly, the negative effects related to extensive 
cooperation are independent of these two aspects. Surely, this is an interesting issue for future 
research. 
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5.2 Firm size differences 
 
In hypothesis 6 we put forward that subsidies and subsidized cooperation are likely to 
be of varying importance for firms with different sizes. We particularly expect differences to 
exist between small and large firms. To test this, the sample of 2.199 firms is split into a 
sample of small firms with less than 100 and those with more than 100 employees (splitting 
our sample into two parts of similar size). As in particular very small firms might be quite 
different, we alternatively consider a third subsample consisting of firms with less than 50 
employees. The previous empirical analysis (model 8) is repeated separately for the three 
subsamples. The results are presented in Table A3 in the Appendix. All estimated models are 
similar to model 8 in terms of coefficients and significance of non-subsidies based variables. 
We therefore refrain from discussing these. 
The estimation of models for the sample of firms with at least 100 employees requires 
the inclusion of the second lag of the dependent variable (LOGEMPt-2) to avoid significant 
second-order autocorrelation. We pointed out above that the antipodal coefficient of CPROJ’s 
second lag disappears when considering the second lag of the dependent variable in the model 
for the full population (see model 7 and 8). Accordingly, this observation seems to be driven 
by differences between the autocorrelation structure of large and small firms’ employment 
growth. This provides support for model 8 being empirically more reliable than model 7. 
Concerning the two subsidies variables that gained significance in model 8 (complete 
firm population), CPROJ and RESEARCH, we find that the latter one does not obtain a 
significant coefficient in any of the models for the above subsamples implying that its 
influence is not particularly related to these firm size class. In addition, to RESEARCH’s 
significance in the model for the complete firm population (model 8) it also becomes positive 
significant in a (not reported) model that restrict the sample of firms to those with at least 50 
employees. The variable however looses its significance again when considering only firms 
with 100 employees implying that there is no systematic relationship with firm size. 
In the model for firms with at least 100 employees, FIRM is positively significant in 
the third lag. The positive coefficient suggests that FIRM is not simply picking up the effect 
of RESEARCH as both are strongly negatively correlated when restricting the sample to firms 
that receive cooperative subsidies (r=-0.47***). The finding means that larger firms tend to 
benefit from collaborating with other firms. 
However, there might be an alternative explanation. FIRM is highly positively 
correlated with DIST (r=0.854***). Therefore, we suspect that FIRM captures negative 
effects related to intensive cooperation with organizations in spatial proximity. It is often 
argued that particularly cooperation with local and regional organization can yield 
benefits.(see for a discussion Boschma, 2005; Broekel et al., 2010). We test this alternative 
explanation by excluding FIRM from the regressions for firms with at least 100 employees. 
DIST becomes positive significant in the third lag implying that there seems to be some 
relevance to this explanation.8
For firms with at least 100 employees, we again observe the negative effect related to 
the number of cooperative projects (CPROJ), which is also visible in the models for the 
complete firm population. Similar is not observed in the models for small firms (less than 50 
 
                                                          
8 To economize on space these results are not reported but can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
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and less than 100 employees). The negative relation between CPROJ and employment growth 
is therefore primarily relevant for larger firms. 
There are many reasons for why extensive cooperation can yield negative effects on 
firm growth, e.g., free-riding, learning races, lack of flexibility and adaptability (see Section 
2). However, these do not seem to be particularly more relevant for large than for small firms. 
We furthermore only explore the effects of subsidized R&D cooperation implying that the 
relationships might be very different for non-subsidized cooperation. 
In light of this, we argue that the negative effects large firms experience when being 
extensively engaged in subsidized R&D cooperation are more likely to be caused by a 
suboptimal choice of cooperation partners and knowledge leakages. Starting with the latter, 
some large firms engage in a huge number of (subsidized) cooperation projects. One firm in 
our sample (a very large one) simultaneously cooperates with 551 organizations. These 
cooperative projects are distributed among different business units and technologies. It might 
very well be the case that the firm is cooperating in one field with a firm that is its direct 
competitor in another field. Given the convoluted structure of many large firms such may 
result in unintended knowledge spillovers and knowledge leakages that can reduce firm 
growth (cf. De Bondt et al., 1992). 
Another potential reason for negative effects associated to extensive cooperation 
activities is the choice of partners. In contrast to non-subsidized cooperation, firms are not 
completely free in choosing their partnering organizations when applying for a joint project 
grant. In many instances, subsidies programs are precisely designed to stimulating 
cooperation between particular types of organizations. Just to name one example, the German 
BioRegio program provides subsidies for cooperation in R&D projects that are formed 
between organizations located within the same geographical region (cf. Dohse, 2000). It could 
therefore be argued that such and similar interference on firms’ cooperation behaviour reduce 
the benefits of cooperation or even results in negative effects.9
 One more variable gains significance in the model for firms larger than 100 
employees, namely SPROJ. The variable represents the number of non-cooperative projects. 
Its first lag becomes positive significant only in the model for firms with at least 100 
employees. It suggests that large firms’ growth can be facilitated with non-cooperative 
subsidies. This is interesting as in the same model the number of cooperative projects is 
negative significant (see above), which clearly highlights differences in the effects of the two 
forms of R&D subsidies. The finding supports the positive evaluation of subsidies for firm 
performance in the literature (cf. Girma et al., 2008; Czarnitzki et al., 2007). 
 However, this remains 
speculative at the moment as this is beyond the present study. It clearly asks for future 
research. 
 All the above results clearly confirm hypothesis 6 according to which the relationship 
between R&D subsidies, cooperation networks, and firm growth differs significantly between 
firm size classes. This particularly concerns the importance of cooperation with different 
types of organizations (universities, research organizations, firms), which we find to vary 
strongly between small and large firms. 
 
                                                          
9 Another prominent interference is the preference of links between organizations located in different member 
states of the EU in the fifth Framework program (Cf. Scherngell and Barber, 2011). 
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6 Conclusion 
 The present paper investigated the relevance of R&D subsidies for firm growth. It 
particularly contributed to the existing literature by differentiating between cooperative and 
non-cooperative R&D subsidies, which are shown to have distinct effects. Moreover, firms’ 
embeddedness into subsidized cooperation networks was evaluated with respect to its 
importance for employment growth. 
 Concerning the empirical results, we did not find any indication that the granted 
(monetary) amounts of R&D subsidies matter. All observed significant effects relate to the 
number of subsidized projects a firm is engaged in. Neither the total amounts of received 
subsidies, nor the size of subsidized projects (as approximated by the average monetary 
amount of an individual grant) were found to impact firm growth. For policy evaluation, our 
findings imply that the effectiveness of programs is less related to the invested resources as to 
the actual specification of the program in terms of the number of supported projects, their 
cooperative character, as well as the particular type of cooperation that are supported. 
 Evidence was provided that the number of subsidized non-cooperative projects a firm is 
involved in can stimulate its growth, at least in case of large firms with more than 100 
employees. This implies that policy should rather initiate a great number of small projects 
instead of focusing the monetary support on few large-scale projects.  
 Interestingly, we found the number of subsidized cooperative projects a firm is engaged 
in being related to significant negative effects on firms’ (and in particular large firms’) 
employment growth. This finding contrasts the growing importance of this type of subsidies 
in recent years (see Broekel and Graf, 2011). 
 Our findings however provide some evidence that if subsidies for cooperation aim at 
supporting interactions between firms and research organizations they can yield positive 
effects. The same is true when subsidized joint projects connect large firms to other firms 
located at larger geographical distances. Accordingly, our study highlights the importance of 
the particular design of R&D support policies. Clearly a “one size fits all” approach to R&D 
subsidies programs will yield suboptimal results. 
 The presented study has a number of shortcomings that need to be pointed out. Amongst 
these is its focus on the direct relationship between R&D subsidies and employment growth. 
It can very well be argued that R&D subsidies primarily aim at enhancing firms’ innovative 
capacities, which do not necessarily influence firms’ employment growth. This implies that 
we probably underestimated the effects of R&D subsidies.  
 For the empirical analysis we pooled the data for firms active in a wide range of 
industries. It seems to be more than likely that significant inter-industrial differences exist in 
the effectiveness and relevance of such subsidies. For instance, R&D subsidies are likely to be 
of larger importance in research-intensive industries. The employed data also covers only 
support programs by the German federal government. Support from inter-national 
organizations (e.g. EU) might have very distinct effects that are not considered in this study. 
The same might hold for programs initiated at sub-national levels (regions, districts, cities). 
These issues clearly lay the path for future research. 
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Appendix 
 
 
 
Table A1: Correlation matrix 
No. EMP PROD SUBS SUBSP PROJ SUM CSUM SUMP CSUMP SPROJ CPROJ DEGREE BETW UNI RESEARCH FIRM
EMP - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
PROD 0.000 (0.966) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
SUBS 0.768 (0.000) -0.001 (0.913) - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
SUBSP 0.126 (0.000) -0.001 (0.865) 0.339 (0.000) - - - - - - - - - - - - -
PROJ 0.861 (0.000) -0.002 (0.826) 0.925 (0.000) 0.319 (0.000) - - - - - - - - - - - -
SUM 0.628 (0.000) -0.001 (0.926) 0.928 (0.000) 0.355 (0.000) 0.812 (0.000) - - - - - - - - - - -
CSUM 0.789 (0.000) -0.001 (0.914) 0.962 (0.000) 0.297 (0.000) 0.923 (0.000) 0.790 (0.000) - - - - - - - - - -
SUMP 0.169 (0.000) -0.001 (0.930) 0.407 (0.000) 0.739 (0.000) 0.354 (0.000) 0.538 (0.000) 0.274 (0.000) - - - - - - - - -
CSUMP 0.164 (0.000) -0.002 (0.793) 0.326 (0.000) 0.720 (0.000) 0.331 (0.000) 0.210 (0.000) 0.380 (0.000) 0.205 (0.000) - - - - - - - -
SPROJ 0.714 (0.000) -0.001 (0.881) 0.853 (0.000) 0.374 (0.000) 0.882 (0.000) 0.860 (0.000) 0.770 (0.000) 0.531 (0.000) 0.243 (0.000) - - - - - - -
CPROJ 0.859 (0.000) -0.002 (0.816) 0.894 (0.000) 0.277 (0.000) 0.982 (0.000) 0.740 (0.000) 0.925 (0.000) 0.261 (0.000) 0.345 (0.000) 0.778 (0.000) - - - - - -
DEGREE 0.873 (0.000) -0.001 (0.874) 0.872 (0.000) 0.238 (0.000) 0.971 (0.000) 0.730 (0.000) 0.898 (0.000) 0.254 (0.000) 0.283 (0.000) 0.792 (0.000) 0.980 (0.000) - - - - -
BETW 0.865 (0.000) -0.001 (0.925) 0.836 (0.000) 0.135 (0.000) 0.922 (0.000) 0.700 (0.000) 0.860 (0.000) 0.207 (0.000) 0.153 (0.000) 0.757 (0.000) 0.928 (0.000) 0.943 (0.000) - - - -
UNI 0.084 (0.000) -0.001 (0.895) 0.119 (0.000) 0.305 (0.000) 0.202 (0.000) 0.096 (0.000) 0.126 (0.000) 0.128 (0.000) 0.347 (0.000) 0.166 (0.000) 0.203 (0.000) 0.164 (0.000) 0.070 (0.000) - - -
RESEARCH 0.072 (0.000) -0.006 (0.472) 0.124 (0.000) 0.353 (0.000) 0.201 (0.000) 0.081 (0.000) 0.145 (0.000) 0.107 (0.000) 0.462 (0.000) 0.104 (0.000) 0.226 (0.000) 0.179 (0.000) 0.070 (0.000) 0.162 (0.000) - -
FIRM 0.122 (0.000) -0.003 (0.727) 0.176 (0.000) 0.428 (0.000) 0.316 (0.000) 0.115 (0.000) 0.205 (0.000) 0.134 (0.000) 0.579 (0.000) 0.169 (0.000) 0.354 (0.000) 0.305 (0.000) 0.124 (0.000) 0.331 (0.000) 0.448 (0.000) -
DIST 0.134 (0.000) -0.001 (0.953) 0.189 (0.000) 0.448 (0.000) 0.316 (0.000) 0.131 (0.000) 0.215 (0.000) 0.154 (0.000) 0.602 (0.000) 0.183 (0.000) 0.348 (0.000) 0.295 (0.000) 0.123 (0.000) 0.421 (0.000) 0.592 (0.000) 0.854 (0.000)
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A2: R&D subsidies and employment growth - all time lags 
 
 
  
 
Full Models 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
VARIABLES logEMP logEMP logEMP logEMP logEMP logEMP logEMP logEMP
Log(EMP)t-1 1.050*** (0.0334) 1.112*** (0.0672) 1.066*** (0.0545) 1.054*** (0.0365) 1.000*** (0.023) 1.017*** (0.0312) 1.014*** (0.0213) 1.125*** (0.101)
Log(EMP)t-2 - - - - - - - -0.134 (0.0979)
Log(PROD)t 0.113** (0.0531) 0.143** (0.0643) 0.122* (0.0649) 0.0968* (0.0532) 0.0899* (0.0509) 0.0889* (0.048) 0.0719 (0.0443) 0.0598 (0.0696)
2004 -0.0223* (0.0136) -0.0205 (0.0154) -0.0208 (0.0147) -0.0223* (0.0135) -0.0220* (0.0132) -0.0254* (0.0139) -0.0317** (0.013) -0.0382** (0.0152)
2005 -0.0773 (0.0652) -0.0655 (0.0718) -0.062 (0.0699) -0.0751 (0.0649) -0.0813 (0.0642) -0.0921 (0.0653) -0.130** (0.0602) -
2006 -0.0312 (0.0503) -0.0175 (0.0553) -0.0208 (0.0541) -0.0296 (0.0495) -0.037 (0.0484) -0.0462 (0.0501) -0.0681 (0.0463) -0.0949* (0.0543)
2007 -0.0469 (0.0334) -0.0362 (0.0374) -0.0393 (0.0358) -0.039 (0.034) -0.0448 (0.0334) -0.0482 (0.0343) -0.0648** (0.0322) -0.0862** (0.0364)
2008 -0.0015 (0.0199) 0.0004 (0.0217) 0.0037 (0.0212) -0.0002 (0.0199) -0.0041 (0.0198) -0.0068 (0.0201) -0.0195 (0.0184) -0.0212 (0.0203)
SUBSt-1 -2.80e-08 (2.56e-08) - - - - - - -
SUBSt-2 -7.65e-08* (4.23e-08) - - - - - - -
SUBSt-3 4.26e-08 (4.08e-08) - - - - - - -
SUBSPt-1 - 5.76e-07 (7.48e-07) - - - - - -
SUBSPt-2 - -9.18e-07 (8.72e-07) - - - - - -
SUBSPt-3 - -3.06e-07 (4.85e-07) - - - - - -
PROJt-1 - -0.0076 (0.0174) - - - - - -
PROJt-2 - 0.0176 (0.0174) - - - - - -
PROJt-3 - -0.0253* (0.0142) - - - - - -
SUMt-1 - - -4.83e-08 (6.37e-08) - - - - -
SUMt-2 - - -1.01e-07 (7.07e-08) - - - - -
SUMt-3 - - 2.02e-08 (1.27e-07) - - - - -
CSUMt-1 - - -6.11e-09 (2.00e-07) - - - - -
CSUMt-2 - - -1.26e-08 (2.43e-07) - - - - -
CSUMt-3 - - -4.41e-08 (9.57e-08) - - - - -
SUMP_Pt-1 - - - 4.80e-07 (5.67e-07) -2.42e-08 (7.14e-07) 1.06e-07 (5.64e-07) -7.09e-08 (3.42e-07) -7.19e-07 (7.61e-07)
SUMP_Pt-2 - - - -2.78e-07 (5.07e-07) 2.59e-07 (5.09e-07) 1.91e-07 (4.08e-07) 3.39e-07 (3.67e-07) 3.35e-07 (3.94e-07)
SUMP_Pt-3 - - - -2.26e-08 (3.48e-07) -3.81e-07 (3.02e-07) -2.54e-07 (2.63e-07) -4.34e-07 (3.81e-07) -1.12e-07 (3.44e-07)
CSUMP_Pt-1 - - - -2.39e-07 (5.87e-07) 5.62e-07 (5.04e-07) 7.35e-08 (4.50e-07) 2.75e-07 (6.15e-07) 9.15e-07 (1.24e-06)
CSUMP_Pt-2 - - - 1.35e-09 (5.02e-07) 1.43e-07 (3.73e-07) -2.26e-08 (3.67e-07) -4.70e-07 (7.18e-07) -8.03e-07 (9.78e-07)
CSUMP_Pt-3 - - - -2.05e-07 (4.18e-07) -2.64e-07 (3.18e-07) -1.16e-07 (3.82e-07) 2.17e-07 (4.64e-07) 2.41e-07 (4.42e-07)
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Table A2a: R&D subsidies and employment growth - all time lags (addition to 1a) 
  
SPROJt-1 - - - 0.0231 (0.0527) 0.0326 (0.055) 0.0534 (0.0437) 0.039 (0.0385) 0.0589 (0.0416)
SPROJt-2 - - - -0.0156 (0.0219) -0.030 (0.0297) -0.0241 (0.0309) -0.0178 (0.0155) -0.0164 (0.0224)
SPROJt-3 - - - -0.0384 (0.0365) 0.0012 (0.0359) -0.021 (0.0404) -0.0166 (0.0261) -0.0365 (0.0352)
CPROJt-1 - - - -0.0266** (0.0123) -0.0169 (0.0646) -0.0251 (0.024) -0.0193** (0.0092) -0.0272** (0.0128)
CPROJt-2 - - - 0.0386 (0.024) 0.0138 (0.0472) 0.023 (0.0191) 0.0361* (0.0204) 0.0459 (0.0317)
CPROJt-3 - - - -0.0142 (0.0184) -0.0123 (0.0277) -0.0177 (0.0254) -0.0222 (0.0147) -0.0207 (0.0264)
DEGREEt-1 - - - - 0.0005 (0.0075) - - -
DEGREEt-2 - - - - 0.0016 (0.0043) - - -
DEGREEt-3 - - - - -0.0004 (0.0033) - - -
BETWt-1 - - - - - 3.75e-06 (9.52e-06) - -
BETWt-2 - - - - - 1.01e-06 (3.07e-06) - -
BETWt-3 - - - - - 6.35e-07 (4.10e-06) - -
UNIt-1 - - - - - - -0.0308 (0.369) 0.149 (0.343)
UNIt-2 - - - - - - -0.196 (0.212) -0.476 (0.382)
UNIt-3 - - - - - - 0.161 (0.151) 0.347 (0.317)
RESEARCHt-1 - - - - - - -0.0699 (0.410) 0.212 (0.511)
RESEARCHt-2 - - - - - - -0.486 (0.383) -0.632 (0.408)
RESEARCHt-3 - - - - - - 0.400** (0.186) 0.407* (0.221)
FIRMt-1 - - - - - - 0.111 (0.175) -0.0249 (0.190)
FIRMt-2 - - - - - - -0.123 (0.154) -0.141 (0.211)
FIRMt-3 - - - - - - 0.118 (0.118) 0.147 (0.157)
DISTt-1 - - - - - - 0.0002 (0.0004) -0.0001 (0.0006)
DISTt-2 - - - - - - 0.0003 (0.0004) 0.0006 (0.0006)
DISTt-3 - - - - - - -0.0004 (0.0003) -0.0005 (0.0004)
Constant 44.01 (27.4) 39.83 (31.12) 40.85 (29.71) 44.06 (27.28) 43.76 (26.67) 50.50* (27.99) 63.23** (26.19) 76.48** (30.72)
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Table A2b: R&D subsidies and employment growth - all time lags (addition to 1 and 1a) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Observations 11101 11101 11101 11101 11101 11101 11101 11101
Number of firms 2189 2189 2189 2189 2189 2189 2189 2189
No.instruments 47 48 46 66 76 76 106 95
AR (1) -3.964 -3.862 -3.934 -3.939 -3.961 -3.967 -4.025 -3.1
AR (1) p-value 7.36E-05 0.000112 8.35E-05 8.18E-05 7.47E-05 7.28E-05 5.69E-05 2.00E-03
AR (2) 1.585 1.59 1.579 1.541 1.55 1.544 1.624 1.61
AR (2) p-value 0.113 0.112 0.114 0.123 0.121 0.123 0.104 0.108
Obs/group avg 5.071 5.071 5.071 5.071 5.071 5.071 5.071 4.08
Obs/group max 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 5
Obs/group min 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Wald chi2 4145 2840 2546 22482 74004 68627 98541 70054.33
Wald chi2 p-value 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hansen 31.06 20.5 24.22 26.66 41.34 40.08 54.32 52.16
Hansen p-value 0.703 0.967 0.836 0.99 0.877 0.905 0.958 0.833
Sargan 32.3 25.08 27.04 39.4 45.9 46.76 70.99 45.06
Sargan p-value 0.645 0.867 0.716 0.743 0.745 0.714 0.578 0.957
St.errors in parenth. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A3: R&D subsidies and employment growth -size disaggregation 
<50 <100 >100
VARIABLES logEMP logEMP logEMP
Log(EMP)t-1 0.8300*** (0.0748) 0.8700*** (0.0703) 1.0540*** (0.0770)
Log(EMP)t-2 0.0114 (0.0573) 0.0440 (0.0462) -0.0039 (0.0788)
Log(PROD)t - - -0.0829 (0.0617)
2004 0.0002 (0.0002) 0.0101 (0.0256) -0.0705*** (0.0189)
2005 -0.0353* (0.0197) 0.0114 (0.1210) -
2006 0.0013 (0.0277) 0.0441 (0.0955) -0.2160*** (0.0658)
2007 -0.0013 (0.0189) 0.0101 (0.0666) -0.1670*** (0.0418)
2008 0.0098 (0.0173) 0.0141 (0.0397) -0.0603*** (0.0225)
SUMPt-1 6.26e-07 (2.74e-06) -8.28e-08 (2.38e-07) -9.96e-07 (7.18e-07)
SUMPt-2 -3.72e-07 (7.07e-07) 8.63e-08 (2.91e-07) 2.02e-07 (4.47e-07)
SUMPt-3 -2.60e-07 (3.57e-07) 6.19e-08 (3.73e-07) 7.79e-08 (3.43e-07)
CSUMt-1 3.66e-07 (2.12e-06) 1.22e-06 (1.45e-06) 7.40e-07 (7.12e-07)
CSUMt-2 6.33e-07 (8.64e-07) 6.48e-08 (1.05e-06) -3.77e-07 (8.29e-07)
CSUMt-3 2.26e-07 (1.05e-06) -4.37e-07 (6.56e-07) 1.33e-07 (5.62e-07)
SPROJt-1 -0.0538 (0.1440) 0.1030 (0.1140) 0.0612* (0.0372)
SPROJt-2 0.1060 (0.0885) -0.0351 (0.1070) -0.0226 (0.0232)
SPROJt-3 -0.0367 (0.0523) -0.0687 (0.0586) -0.0223 (0.0406)
CPROJt-1 -0.0013 (0.0597) 0.0660 (0.0628) -0.0240* (0.0130)
CPROJt-2 0.0129 (0.0261) -0.0051 (0.0433) 0.0262 (0.0245)
CPROJt-3 -0.0175 (0.0281) -0.0688 (0.0589) -0.0038 (0.0186)
UNIt-1 -0.1360 (0.5230) 0.0868 (0.4250) 0.0672 (0.1720)
UNIt-2 -0.3980 (0.3270) -0.4700 (0.3380) -0.2270 (0.1890)
UNIt-3 0.1040 (0.2450) 0.2950 (0.3060) 0.1440 (0.1510)
RESEARCHt-1 -0.0738 (0.3090) -0.0316 (0.3680) 0.0775 (0.4020)
RESEARCHt-2 -0.4100 (0.4290) 0.0247 (0.3910) -0.1310 (0.3010)
RESEARCHt-3 0.1650 (0.2670) -0.0696 (0.3070) 0.2040 (0.1680)
FIRMt-1 0.1490 (0.4340) -0.0471 (0.2300) -0.1840 (0.1550)
FIRMt-2 -0.0179 (0.1620) -0.0582 (0.1400) -0.2730 (0.1770)
FIRMt-3 -0.0180 (0.1540) 0.0600 (0.1580) 0.2310** (0.1120)
DISTt-1 -0.0002 (0.0004) 3.94e-05 (0.0005) 0.0003 (0.0004)
DISTt-2 0.0004 (0.0004) 0.0003 (0.0004) 0.0004 (0.0005)
DISTt-3 -9.41e-05 (0.0004) 0.0002 (0.0004) -0.0004 (0.0003)
Constant 0.0000 (0.0000) -20.0300 (51.6400) 141.9000*** (38.3300)
Observations 2.552 4.46 5.288
Number of firms 500 879 1209
No. instruments 97 103 93
AR (1) -2494 -2906 -2143
AR (1) p-value 0.0126 0.00366 0.0321
AR (2) 0.520 0.539 1428
AR (2) p-value 0.603 0.590 0.153
Obs/group avg 5104 5074 4099
Obs/group max 6 6 5
Obs/group min 1 1 1
Wald chi2 309265 987.8 70161
Wald(chi2p-v.) 0 0 0
Hansen 70.10 67.58 48.71
Hansen p-value 0.311 0.593 0.872
Sargan 62.87 58.02 36.65
Sargan p-value 0.552 0.866 0.994
St.errors in paren  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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